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The Americans with Disabilities Act:
Determining which Learning Disabilities
Qualify for Reasonable Accommodations
I. Introduction
In 1990, President George Bush signed into law the Americans with Disabilities
Act' (ADA); the purpose of the Act is to "provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.,
2
Determining which persons qualify for protection under the Act hinges on whether or
not a legal disability is found to exist. Thus far, the methods courts have employed to
make this determination pertain almost exclusively to cases of physical disabilities. Ten
years after the passage of the Act, courts now struggle to decide whether, and to what
extent, those methods should be applied to learning disabilities.
This Note makes two recommendations regarding determinations of whether a per-
son with a learning disability qualifies for reasonable accommodations under the ADA
in a professional licensing situation. First, the proper definition of a disability as applied
to a person with a learning disability should be a definition that considers actions a per-
son takes to improve her learning and cognitive ability. To use the Act's termin6logy,
"self-accommodations" ought to be considered by the courts when they determine
whether a claimant qualifies for reasonable accommodations under the statute. The cog-
nitive coping mechanisms employed by a person with a learning disability, however,
should not be classified by the courts as "self-accommodations." These mechanisms are
better viewed as achievements. Second, the proper comparison group to which the
courts should compare a claimant is that of other persons with comparable training,
skills, and abilities. This is a term of art promulgated by the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) and will be explained more fully later in this Note. These
conclusions rest on careful consideration of the legal questions as well as policy and
ethical implications involved.
To understand properly the debate surrounding the ADA, it is important to first
grasp the impetus behind the Act. For this reason, Part II of this Note provides the con-
text for the legal, policy-based, and ethical analysis of different methodologies. It ex-
plains the 14th Amendment constitutional underpinnings of the concept of equality,
providing an explanation of two different concepts of equality that the courts may em-
ploy. One approach is labeled formal equality, the other substantive equality. The lan-
guage of the Act demonstrates that Congress embraced the notion of substantive equal-
ity when drafting the Act.
Part III explains the logistics and legal protection afforded by the ADA, including
the definition the Act provides for a disability. It describes recent controversies regard-
ing the proper methodology for determining a disability. Particularly, the case of Bartlett
1. 42 USCA § 12101 et seq. (1994).
2. 42 USCA §1201 (b)(1) (1994).
3. See discussion infra Part VI.
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v. New York State Board of Law Examiners4 provides a useful vehicle to discuss the way
in which courts struggle to adopt a proper approach to determine whether a learning
disability qualifies for protection of the ADA. The Second Circuit will soon decide the
case5 in accordance with three recent Supreme Court decisions6 regarding the role that
self-accommodation has played in decisions of physical disabilities. In the realm of
physical disabilities, any "self-accommodations," for example the availability of medi-
cation to control high blood pressure, is included in the determination of whether a per-
son is disabled, per the ADA.7 This holding is derived from the plain language of the
Act but runs counter to the legislative history of the Act.8 Both the plain language ap-
proach and the legislative history of the ADA are described in detail.
Part IV concludes that the Supreme Court's approach towards physical disabilities is
proper and addresses concerns raised by the methodology. Drawing upon these con-
cerns, Part V compares learning disabilities to physical disabilities. Recognizing the
substantial differences between the two, this Note concludes that the cognitive coping
mechanisms employed by persons with learning disabilities do not qualify as "self-
accommodation" for two reasons. First, the beneficial effects of cognitive coping
mechanisms may not be readily gauged in the instance of learning disabilities, whereas
the improvements afforded by prescriptive aids are often easily assessed as in the in-
stance of physical disabilities. It would prove impracticable to measure a person's
learning disability with the "self-accommodation" and then compare it to a person's
ability without the "self-accommodation." Second, cognitive coping mechanisms should
fall outside the purview of "self-accommodation" based on ethical considerations. To
discount such efforts would de-legitimize individual achievement. Instead, such efforts
ought better to be viewed as accomplishments. By affirming these accomplishments,
such an approach honors the ADA's goal of substantive equality and furthers the
movement towards greater rights for persons with disabilities. Any and all measures
4. 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999).
5. See 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999) (The Supreme Court vacated judgment and remanded the case to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for further consideration in light of Sutton v. United Air
Lines 119 S. Ct. 1752 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999); and Albertsons,
Inc. v. Kirkingburg 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999)).
6. See id. See also discussion infra Part IH-B, §§1-3 (All three cases turned on whether or not physical
disabilities ought to be assessed in light of self-accommodations including: The use of corrective lenses for
eyesight problems, see Sutton v. United Air Lines, 119 S. Ct. at 2143 (1999); medication for high blood
pressure, see Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 119 S. Ct. at 2136 (1999); and subconscious mechanisms
employed to improve poor vision attributable to an uncorrectable eyesight condition, see Albertsons, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2168 (1999)).
7. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136 (1999).
8. See id. at 2137, citing the holding in Sutton v. UnitedAir Lines, 119 S. Ct. at 2146 where the Supreme
Court explained
We conclude that respondent is correct that the approach adopted by the agency
guidelines- that persons are to be evaluated in their hypothetical uncorrected state-
is an impermissible interpretation of the ADA. Looking at the Act as a whole, it is
apparent that if a person is taking measures to correct for, or mitigate, a physical or
mental impairment, the effects of those measures-both positive and negative-must
be taken into account when judging whether that person is 'substantially limited' in a
major life activity and thus 'disabled' under the Act. . . . Because we decide that, by
its terms, the ADA cannot be read in this manner, we have no reason to consider the
ADA's legislative history.
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taken by persons with learning disabilities to realize better achievement should neces-
sarily be part of the assessment of whether a disability exists. To do otherwise would
discount a part of who that person is.
Lastly, Part VI of this Note argues that the proper comparison group by which to
determine if someone with a learning disability qualifies for protection of the ADA
should be that employed by Title I of the Act. Persons with learning disabilities should
be assessed in comparison to other persons with comparable training, skills, and abili-
ties. This is the fairest approach because it rewards persons with learning disabilities
who realize high achievement levels, leads towards better equality, is unlikely to be
over-inclusive, and is practical to employ.
H. Social Impetus for the Disabilities Rights Movement
and Considerations of Equality
Before analyzing the legal, social, and normative complexities surrounding the ADA
and its implications for persons with learning disabilities, it is important to understand
the impetus behind the Act. In American jurisprudence, legislation regarding persons
with disabilities is a relatively recent phenomenon. For example, until the mid-twentieth
century, the only federal laws providing protection for individuals with disabilities were
the Social Security Act of 19359 and the LaFollette-Barden Act of 1943.10 Both of these
acts had a narrow focus. For example, the Social Security Act provisions focused on
providing medical and therapeutic services for 'crippled' children. In comparison, the
LaFollette-Barden Act focused on providing services that would enhance the employ-
ability of persons older than fifteen years of age."
The fruition of the disabilities rights movement came after the landmark decision
Brown v. Board of Education;12 the momentum of the movement stemmed from con-
cerns, similar to those in Brown, of equal protection and due process under the 14th
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 3 In this context, one author explained
that, "The hallmark of the modem [disabilities rights] movement is the refusal of dis-
abled people to be marginalized-that is, to be viewed as 'the Other'-in a society
dominated by non-disabled people.' 4 The disabilities rights movement is fighting for
the right to participate fully in society, "recognition of disabled people as full human
beings and elimination of physical and attitudinal barriers to their full participation in
society."'
' 5
The 14th Amendment provided the vehicle by which the disabilities rights move-
ment achieved the legislative protection of the ADA. Before delving into the protection
that the Act affords, it is useful to establish a framework within which to assess recent
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-99 (1994).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 31-42 (1958) (repealed 1973).
11. LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, DiSABILITIES AND THE LAW § 1.02 (2d ed. 1997).
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 11, at § 1.02 (Tracing the history of the disabilities rights movement, in the
early 1970's two court decisions provided increased impetus to intensify the momentum of the disabilities
rights movement. The two cases were Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children (PARC) v.
Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) and Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C.
1972). These two cases established that "denying education to children with disabilities or treating them
differently within the educational system was a denial of equal protection and due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.").
14. Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The Failure of the





development and controversy surrounding interpretation of the ADA. At its base, this
framework consists of the concept of equality characterized substantive equality. This
concept is derived from the 14th Amendment and employed by the ADA.
Section 1 of the 14th Amendment states: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," from which is derived the equal citizen-
ship principle. 16 There are many different interpretations of the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment among jurists.17 The two most prominent
concepts of equality are formal equality and substantive equality. Depending on which
concept is adopted, jurists will likely come to dramatically different conclusions when
faced with the same question. 8 Ultimately, through close examination of the language
of the ADA, this Note concludes that substantive equality is a more appropriate frame-
work by which to analyze current ADA issues.
A. Formal Equality
In search of a basic definition to the term equality, one theorist has explained that
"equality, pure and simple, can be reduced to a formal abstraction-the idea that like
cases should be treated alike."'19 But the "likeness" dimension compared should be es-
sential in content-and not arbitrary. For example, an essential criterion for comparison
might be talent, while an arbitrary comparison might be hair color. Given the variety of
"essential" dimensions, however, in which people might be considered "like," this sim-
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, §1 (emphasis added).
17. See ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1994) (West explains that jurists interpret the Equal Protection Clause in many ways. West
wrote: "The two interpretations of equal protection that dominate current law, which we might call formalist
and antisubordinationist, have in one form or another been present in judicial interpretations of the phrase
from its genesis." Id. at 11. West also refers to the antisubordinationist theory as "substantive justice." Id. at
10. This Note adopts the term substantive equality. See discussion infra Part I-A, §2.).
18. See id. at 90-99. West discusses the meaning of the equal protection clause by way of example. West
describes a movement towards formal equality in the judiciary by the use of three cases: Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 US 483 (1954); Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 US 265 (1978); and City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company, 488 US 469 (1989). Id. at 90-92.
West claims that in Brown, the Court embraced "a substantive account of the equal protection clause:
separate and unequal educational facilities produce unequal educational opportunities, contributing directly to
the subordination of blacks and dominance of whites in an already white-dominated society." Id. at 91
(emphasis added).
West claims that the progression towards formal equality is evidenced by the Bakke decision; West
explains that Bakke stands for the proposition that "the equal protection clause does not require an end to
subordination, but rather, requires that likes be treated alike... [B]lacks and whites are, for all purposes that
matter, alike, and any segregatory scheme - whether 'equal' or 'unequal,' and whatever its impact on the
dominance or subordination of one race vis-A-vis the other - treats the two groups differently and is hence
presumptively unconstitutional." Id. at 91.
Lastly, West claims that the movement toward formal equality is complete based on the Court's
decision in Croson:
Far from requiring race-conscious dismantling of institutional and social
subordination of blacks, a more united, as well as more conservative, Court held that
the Fourteenth Amendment presumptively prohibits most race-conscious decision
making, absent strong evidentiary showings of past discrimination. Affirmative action
aimed at ending subordination is not only not required by the Fourteenth Amendment,
it is prohibited by it.
Id. at 92.
19. Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 246 (1983).
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pie definition proves problematic and elusive. This is the long-criticized problem with
the seemingly simple concept of formal equality.2 °
For example, specifying one dimension by which to label individuals "alike," may
necessarily lead to inequality for individuals who share a characteristic which is not the
specified criteria for comparison. This inequality is significant because, indisputably,
there are many non-arbitrary criteria by which to compare individuals. "Because of its
relational nature, equality is bound to create some inequality. 'The question.. .' is not
'Whether equality?' but 'Which equality? ' ' 21 Therefore, "[t]o make sense of any claim
to equality, one must connect that claim to some substantive value. But substantive val-
ues compete with one another; thus the rhetoric of equality, . .. 'is subject to use, if not
capture, by any side of the question.- 22 For this reason, formal equality is a poor in-
strument by which to gauge whether society has achieved what it would deem a fair
treatment of all people.
B. Substantive Equality
In contrast, substantive equality approaches the topic from a different perspective.23
Substantive equality, at a minimum, clarifies that "all individuals are moral actors enti-
tled to equal autonomy and respect, capable of making moral choices and of rationally
pursuing their life-plans... [I]t justifies those equalities and inequalities that, in a given
social context, are compatible with equal autonomy and respect for all.
' 24
Under this approach, the equal citizenship principle defines equality as a right "to be
treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating mem-
ber."25 Accordingly, the "principle [of equality] is preemptively violated when the or-
ganized society treats someone as an inferior, as part of a dependent caste, or as a non-
participant. 26 Such a notion further clarifies a substantive value in equality. Equality is
not only being a member of society, but feeling a sense of belonging to that society.
27
That is why stigma is equality's antithesis: "Stigma dissolves the human ties we call
'acceptance' and excludes the stigmatized from 'belonging' as equals. Stigma represents
the breakdown of empathy.,
28
Substantive equality, then, appears to have been the driving force behind the dis-
abilities rights movement. If the "hallmark" of the movement is the end of marginaliza-
tion, it is also the end of stigma, and the realization of acceptance. The argument that
20. See MICHAEL QUINN, JUSTICE AND EGALITARIANISM: FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY IN SOME
RECENT THEORIES OF JUSTICE 9-14 (1991). In describing Aristotle's theories about equality, Quinn explains
that
[t]he imperative of justice, for Aristotle, is to treat equals equally, and unequals
unequally . . . Aristotle is plainly aware that 'the question we must keep in mind is,
equality or inequality in what sort of thing.' It is clear that for Aristotle the important
task is the substantive one of establishing which particular inequalities are to count as
relevant to a discussion of justice.
Id. at 10.
21. Michel Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality and Equal Opportunity: A Jurisprudential Appraisal, 74 CAL.
L. REV. 1687 at 1700 (emphasis added) (1983).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1701.
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. Karst, supra note 19, at 247-48 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 248.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. See discussion supra Part II & n.14.
20001
Journal of Legislation
the ADA posits a substantive equality approach, however, is most strongly bolstered by
the language of the Act itself. For example, if the ADA had adopted a notion of formal
equality, one would expect that it merely demand that no party discriminate against a
person with a disability. This would neutralize the disabled characteristic of the individ-
ual, requiring no affirmative steps towards the accommodation of persons with disabili-
ties. The definition of discrimination adopted by the ADA, however, goes farther than
30mere nondiscrimination.
The ADA mandates that failure on the part of covered entities to make reasonable
accommodations constitutes discrimination under its terms. Mere nondiscrimination,
in its traditional sense of not allowing criteria to negatively affect selection, is not suffi-
cient for purposes of the ADA. Instead, the ADA requires that covered entities take
steps to ensure that persons with disabilities have the opportunity to participate fully in
society. For these reasons, this Note will evaluate the controversy regarding ADA pro-
tection for persons with learning disabilities under the penumbra of substantive equality.
M11. The Americans with Disabilities Act
The purpose of the ADA is
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the
standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities;
and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce
the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the
major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
32
30. See e.g. Colette G. Matzzie, Note, Substantive Equality and Antidiscrimination: Accommodating
Pregnancy under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 82 GEO. L. J. 193, 211-12 (1993). (Author discusses the
definition of discrimination included in the ADA. Author cites 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. m1 1991)
providing that "the term discriminate includes: . . . not making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.").
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994). The provision explains that the term "discriminate" means "not
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity."
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b) (1994). See also CCH EDITORIAL STAFF PUBLICATION, AMERICANS wrI
DISABILImS ACT OF 1990 LAW AND EXPLANATION 10. The purpose of the ADA is to address
the problem of discrimination against individuals with disabilities in such critical
areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation,
communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to
public services . . . to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to bring persons
with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American life; to provide
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
and to ensure that the federal government plays a central role in enforcing these
standards on behalf of individuals with disabilities
Id. (emphasis added).
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Thus, the question of what qualifies as a "disability" is central to determining
whether an individual qualifies for protection under the Act. With respect to an individ-
ual, the term "disability" means:
(1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual;
(2) a record of such an impairment; or
(3) being regarded as having such an impairment.33
This definition of disability is the same as employed in an earlier piece of legislation, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 34 The Rehabilitation Act protects individuals with disabili-
ties from discrimination in the areas of employment, education, public facilities, trans-
portation, and health and welfare services. The Rehabilitation Act, however, reaches
"only a small segment of the employment sector because its protection is limited to em-
ployees of federal employers, federal contractors, and recipients of federal financial
assistance. 36 In comparison, the ADA fills this gap by covering all employers with
fifteen or more employees. 37 "It should be noted that the ADA does not preempt the
Rehabilitation Act, and most employers covered by the Rehabilitation Act will also be
covered by the ADA.,
38
The ADA is divided into five titles. The first three titles set out the appropriate stan-
dard by which to conclude whether a legal disability exists. Title I prohibits discrimina-
tion in employment.39 Title II prohibits discrimination with respect to public services, 40
and Title III deals with public accommodations and services operated by private enti-
ties.4' Title I delineates the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as the
agency appointed to help promulgate regulations for workplace discrimination.4 2 Titles
II and III fall under the purview of the Department of Justice (DOJ).43 Depending upon
which title violation a plaintiff claims, a different agency promulgates the standard of
comparison. For example, a plaintiff who claims workplace discrimination must show
that she suffers a disability in comparison to other applicants with similar training,
33. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
34. 29 U.S.C.. §§ 790-96.
35. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 11, at §4.06.
36. Id.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 l(5)(A) (1994).
38. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 11, at §4.06.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). The section explains that "No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994). The section provides that "Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination
by any such [public] entity."
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994). The section explains that "No individual shall be discriminated on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates a place of public accommodation."




skills, and abilities. 44 The best way to grasp the methodology employed thus far in en-
forcing the ADA is to see it applied in a specific situation. For this reason, the Bartlett
case is a particularly useful vehicle for discussion.
A. New York State Board of Law Examiners v. Bartlett
In June 1999, the Supreme Court, in New York State Board of Law Examiners v.
Bartlett,45 vacated the judgment of the Second Circuit. The Court remanded the case for
further consideration in light of Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,46 Murphy v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., 7 and Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg.48
In Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, the Second Circuit had to
decide whether Dr. Marilyn Bartlett was disabled under the ADA and thereby qualified
for reasonable accommodations in taking the New York State Bar Examination.49
Bartlett has a Ph.D. in Educational Administration from New York University, a law
degree from Vermont Law School, and has met all prerequisites to sit for the New York
State Bar Exam. 0 She claims to have a cognitive disorder that impairs her ability to
read.5' The expert employed by the Board of Law Examiners, however, concluded that
Bartlett did not suffer any reading disability. 52 As a result of Bartlett's performance on
two battery tests, the Board instead concluded that Bartlett suffered no learning disabil-
ity whatsoever.53 In response, Bartlett presented expert testimony and other evidence to
the effect that her reading disability could not be measured solely by the Board's test.54
Before the circuit court considered the case, the district court concluded that the
Board's tests were inadequate in assessing Bartlett's learning disability. 55 The district
court, nonetheless, "did not find that Dr. Bartlett [to be] substantially limited in the ma-
jor life activities of reading or learning, reasoning that her 'history of self-accommoda-
44. See discussion infra Part IV-A, § 2 discussing EEOC guidelines for determining whether a claimant
qualifies for protection of the ADA.
45. 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999).
46. Id. at 1752.
47. Id. at 2133.
48. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
49. Bartlett, 156 F.3d at 323 (2d Cir. 1998).
50. See id. at 324.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 325.
53. See id. ("Dr. Veilutino's opinion is grounded primarily on Dr. Bartlett's performance on two subtests
of the Woodcock Reading Mastery Test-Revised (the Woodcock), a battery of tests commonly employed to
assess learning disabilities. Because Dr. Bartlett achieved scores above the 3 0 t percentile on two subtests of
that battery, Dr. Vellutino concluded that she did not have a reading disability.").
54. See id.
55. See id. at 325. The district court opined that
(a) the Woodcock could not measure Dr. Bartlett's lack of 'automaticity,' i.e., her
ability to recognize a printed word and read it accurately and immediately
without thinking;
(b) the Woodcock was not timed and thus could not measure the slowness of
reading-an important characteristic of adult dyslexics like Dr. Bartlett, who, on
other tests, had demonstrated a reading rate comparable to the bottom fourth
percentile of college freshman when timed;
(c) the Woodcock was designed principally to assess children and did not have
enough items in the difficult range; and
(d) Dr. Bartlett's Woodcock results exhibited discrepancies, revealing high reading
comprehension scores in comparison to low, but average, Word Attack and Word
Identification scores.
[Vol. 26:355
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tion has allowed her to achieve . ., roughly average reading skills (on some measures)
when compared to the general population. 6 Instead, the district court con-
cluded Bartlett to be "disabled in her ability to 'work' because her reading rate com-
pared unfavorably with 'persons of comparable training, skills and abilities."
57
Disagreeing with the district court's reasoning, the Second Circuit held that Bartlett
was substantially limited in her major life activity of reading or learning, but as com-
pared to the manner and condition under which the average person can read or learn.58
The Second Circuit reasoned that "a person's ability to self-accommodate does not fore-
close a finding of disability., 59 The Second Circuit also pointed out that without the
cognitive coping mechanisms Bartlett had developed, compared to an average person,
she would suffer substantial limitations in her major life activities. 60 The court went on
to describe legislative history and case law supporting the proposition that disabilities
should be assessed without regard to mitigating measures "such as reasonable accom-
modations or auxiliary aids."
61
The difference between the two courts' opinions turns on whether or not it is appro-
priate to take self-accommodations into consideration when defining a disability, and
then to which group of persons a court should compare a claimant. This difference in
approach leaves fertile ground for discussion: Should, from a legal and ethical stand-
point, courts take into consideration self-accommodations when assessing a disability?
Do the cognitive coping mechanisms that persons with disabilities employ qualify as
"self-accommodations?" Should learning disability questions be assessed in terms of the
average population, or with a comparison group comprised of those with similar train-
ing, skills, and abilities? The Supreme Court answered the first question in Sutton, Mur-
phy, and Albertsons,
B. Disability Assessments and Consideration of Self-Accommodations
The Supreme Court decided Sutton, Murphy, and Albertsons on the same day.62 All
three cases turned on whether the Court's assessment of a person claiming a disability
should include mitigating actions.
1. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.
In Sutton, the Supreme Court questioned whether twin sisters who both suffered se-
vere myopia, should have their condition assessed with regard to the corrective lenses
available that improved each girl's eyesight.63 The Court held "the determination of
whether an individual is disabled should be made with reference to measures that miti-
gate the individual's impairment, including ... eyeglasses and contact lenses."64
56. Id. at 326.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 329.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. Id. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(1), at 52 (1990), and then describing Done v. City of Omaha, 115
F.3d 624, 627-28 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[The plaintiffs] brain has mitigated the effects of his impairment, but our
analysis of whether he is disabled does not include consideration of mitigating measures. His personal,
subconscious adjustments to the impairment do not take him outside of the protective provisions of the
ADA.")).
62. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999); Murphy v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct.
2133 (1999); and Albertsons Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).




2. Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
In Murphy, the question presented to the Court was whether a mechanic's high
blood pressure should be examined in its medicated state or its unmedicated state.65 The
Court concluded that the Tenth Circuit correctly considered petitioner in his medicated
state.66 Accordingly, the Court affirmed that "[Murphy's] hypertension is not a disability
because his doctor had testified that when [Murphy] is medicated, he 'functions nor-
mally doing everyday activity that an everyday person does.'
67
3. Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg
In Albertsons, the Court clarified the definition of disability with regards to another
type of eyesight problem. In Albertsons, the plaintiff suffered from "amblyopia, an un-
correctable condition that leaves him with 20/200 vision in his left eye and monocular
vision in effect. '68 The Ninth Circuit erroneously had suggested that "in gauging
whether a monocular individual has a disability a court need not take account of the
individual's ability to compensate for the impairment. ' 69 In its analysis, however, the
circuit court acknowledged that Kirkingburg's brain had developed subconscious
mechanisms for coping with his visual impairment; in other words, his body compen-
sated for his disability. 70 The Supreme Court explained that such compensation was
extremely important to the disability determination. 71 The Court explained that it saw
"no principled basis for distinguishing between measures undertaken with artificial aids,
like medications and devices, and measures undertaken, whether consciously or not,
with the body's own systems., 72
Thus, the dilemma presents itself: how should the holdings in Sutton, Murphy, and
Albertsons affect the law's treatment of persons with learning disabilities? Do the cog-
nitive coping mechanisms that persons with disabilities employ qualify as "self-
accommodations?" Should learning disability questions be assessed in terms of the av-
erage population, or with the comparison group being those with similar training, skills,
and abilities?
C. Recent Developments: The Sutton Plain Language Approach
As a matter of proper judicial interpretation, despite legislative history and interpre-
tive guidelines, the law lies in the language of the statute itself. The majority in Sutton
explained that the plain terms of the ADA provided the answer to whether mitigating
circumstances should be taken into consideration in making a disability determination,
and are therefore controlling.73
The crux of the Sutton approach rests on the term "substantially limits," which is
written in the present tense. The Court in Sutton held that the language demands that
such limitation actually and presently exist.74 This is the Court's view of the plain
65. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136 (1999).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2137.
68. Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2165-66 (1999).
69. See id. at 2168.
70. Id. at 2168.
71. See id. at 2168-69.
72. Id. at 2169.
73. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
74. Id.
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meaning of the statute, to which any further interpretation must adhere. 75 While the ma-
jority recognized that this contradicts the legislative history and interpretive agency
edicts, it stressed that the statute's terms, because they are not ambiguous, must con-
trol.
76
Furthermore, the Court went on to reiterate the fact that "whether a person has a
disability under the ADA is an 'individualized inquiry.' 77 The Court explained that to
follow agency guidelines and discount accommodating measures would run counter to
this mandate because it "would ... require courts and employers to speculate about a
person's condition and would, in many cases, force them to make a disability determi-
nation based on general information about how an uncorrected impairment usually af-
fects individuals, rather than on the individual's actual condition.
78
In further support of its position, the Sutton Court explained that the stated findings
contained in the beginning text of the ADA also support the conclusion that self-
accommodations should be included in the determination of a disability.79 The Court
pointed to the statute's estimate that 43 million persons suffer from disabilities.80 The
Court asserted that this number would be significantly higher if it included all health
impairments in their untreated state.8' Justice Ginsburg agreed with the majority opinion
in her concurrence; she stated:
The strongest clues to Congress' perception of the domain of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), as [she sees it], are legislative findings that 'some 43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities,' §12101(a)(1), and that
'individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority,' persons 'subjected to a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political power-
lessness in our society,' §12101(a)(7). These declarations are inconsistent with the
enormously embracing definition of disability petitioners urge.
82
D. Legislative History: Judicial Interpretation, Published Guidelines on the
Disability Definition, and Mitigating Measures
Although the Supreme Court concluded that the plain meaning of the ADA required
that mitigating measures be a part of the assessment, this is not consistent with the Act's
legislative history. Before assessing the Supreme Court's approach, it is important to
understand the legislative history and administrative guidelines from which the Court
deviated.
1. Case Law and Legislative History
In a case similar to Bartlett, hinging on the question of whether mitigating measures
should weigh in the determination of a disability, the Fifth Circuit offered a concise
explanation of the legislative history surrounding the issue of whether to include miti-
gating measures in the determination. In Washington v. HCA Health Services of Texas,
Inc.,8 3 the court described the findings of the House Education and Labor Committee
Report that discusses the three-pronged definition of a disability.8 4 Of primary concern
75. See id.
76. See id.




81. See id. at 2147.
82. Id. at 2152 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
83. Washington v. HCA Health Services of Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1998).
84. See id. at 467.
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is the first prong ("a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of such individual"85 ). The court quoted the report:
'Whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the avail-
ability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids.
For example, a person who is hard of hearing is substantially limited in the major life
activity of hearing, even though the loss may be corrected through the use of a hear-
ing aid. Likewise, persons with impairments, such as epilepsy or diabetes, which
substantially limit a major life activity are covered under the first prong of the defi-
nition of disability, even if the effects of the impairment are controlled by medica-
tion.
' 8
The court in HCA then considered the House Judiciary Committee Report.87 This
report's findings promulgated a similar approach. "The impairment should be assessed
without considering whether mitigating measures, such as auxiliary aids or reasonable
accommodations would result in a less-than-substantial limitation. 88
Lastly, the HCA opinion looked to the Senate Labor and Human Resources Com-
mittee Report which concluded that "'whether a person has a disability should be as-
sessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable ac-
commodations or auxiliary aids.'- 8 9 The Senate Report, however, went on to describe
that the third prong would 'ensure that persons with medical conditions that are under
control, and that therefore do not currently limit major life activities, are not discrimi-
nated against on the basis of their medical conditions."
90
The Fifth Circuit ultimately placed less weight on the Senate Labor and Human Re-
sources Committee Report. The court explained that the House reports were "express
and directly on point;" while the Senate Report was relevant, it spoke primarily to the
third prong and in doing so, spoke only tangentially to the first prong.91 HCA also de-
ferred to the House Report because it was issued after the Senate Report; "it seems that
the House Committees were aware of how the Senate Report dealt with the mitigating
measures issue and consciously changed the language of the Reports. 92
2. Administrative Agencies: EEOC and DOJ Guidance
Legislative history was not the only interpretive guide available to the Court to help
clarify the appropriate meaning of disability under the ADA. As Sutton explained, in
addition to legislative history, courts may also look to appointed government agencies
for guidance in interpreting the ADA.93 In regards to the ADA, the EEOC has been
granted authority to issue non-legislative guidelines for Title I regarding employment
discrimination. Likewise, the DOJ carries authority to promulgate guidelines for Titles
II and III. Although the Court makes clear that none of these agencies has authority to
85. 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(A).
86. HCA, 152 F.3d at 467 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485(n) at 52 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334).
87. See id. at 468.
88. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 101 -485(IiI), at 28, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451).
89. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989)).
90. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24 (1989)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2144.
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issue regulations as to what the definition of disability is, the Court did recognize the
interpretive value that such agencies may offer.94
On the subject of mitigating measures, the EEOC issued interpretive guidelines that
read: "the determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating measures
such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices., 95 In comparison, the dissent in
Sutton pointed out that the DOJ interpretation of disability likewise obviates the consid-
eration of mitigating measures.96 Justice Stevens wrote, "The Department of Justice has
reached the same conclusion. Its regulations provide that '[tihe question of whether a
person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating
measures, such as reasonable modification or auxiliary aids and services."' 97 Both the
EEOC and DOJ recommend that the determination of whether a claimant is disabled be
made without regard to self-accommodation.
IV. Honoring the Legal and Ethical Objective of the ADA
While the administrative agency approaches indicate that mitigating measures
should not be taken into consideration, the approach of the Supreme Court is appropri-
ate. The Court properly reads the language of the statute and, from its plain meaning,
arrived at the conclusion that mitigating measures will legitimately weigh into decisions
of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity. The Court set out one
possible standard by which an individual will qualify as disabled under the ADA. But
the Court did not foreclose other possible standards. Recall, the ADA provides more
than one prong to the definition of a disability.98 While the Court properly disregarded
legislative history and administrative guidelines in determining whether a person is sub-
stantially limited in the performance of major life activities, the Court left open the pos-
sibility that the history and guidelines may properly be applied to those cases in which a
party claims she is regarded as being substantially limited in a major life activity.
Specifically, the insight of the Fifth Circuit, in HCA, suggests that legislative history
may still prove useful in the case of determining which persons are regarded as disabled.
While the Fifth Circuit placed less weight on the Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee Report, for the reasons aforementioned,99 the court recognized that the Sen-
ate Report honored legislative history. For example, much of the legislative history of
the ADA focuses on physical disabilities: much of the accommodations debate sur-
rounds physical disabilities such as eye sight and high blood pressure. Most of these
impairments may be diagnosed and treated by medical procedures. It was in the broader
goal of preventing discrimination against persons with disabilities that the ADA sought
to ensure that qualified individuals, without even need of accommodation, have equal
94. See id. at 2145.
95. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630).
96. See id. at 2156 (discussing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 35).
98. See discussion supra Part I explaining that the term "disability" means, with respect to an individual
(1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual;
(2) a record of such an impairment; or
(3) being regarded as having such an impairment.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
99. See discussion supra Part I13-D, at § 1.
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opportunity without arbitrary discrimination. 100 Such individuals fall under the "re-
garded" prong of the disability definition.)'
Indeed, attention to the third prong helps to ameliorate the disagreement expressed
by Justice Stevens in the Sutton dissent. Justice Stevens stated that he believes "in order
to be faithful to the remedial purpose of the Act, [the Court] should give it a generous,
rather than a miserly, construction.' 0 2 Stevens pointed first to the fact that if the deter-
mination of disability focuses on mitigated conditions, "impairments that Congress
surely had in mind" would not qualify as disabilities.'
0 3
Stevens explained his assertion by way of example. He started with the proposition
that "[t]he three parts of this definition do not identify mutually exclusive, discrete cate-
gories. On the contrary, they furnish three overlapping formulas aimed at ensuring that
individuals who now have, or ever had, a substantially limiting impairment are covered
by the Act." 1°4 The example Stevens pointed to is the case of individuals who have lost
one or more limbs, but through use of a prostheses and physical therapy can perform all
of their major life activities just as efficiently as "an average couch potato."',0 5 Stevens
argued that "If the Act were just concerned with their present ability to participate in
society, many of these individuals' physical impairments would not be viewed as dis-
abilities. Similarly, if the statute were solely concerned with whether these individuals
viewed themselves as disabled - or whether a majority of employers regarded them as
unable to perform most jobs - many of these individuals would lack statutory protection
from discrimination based on their prosthesis.'
10 6
After this, Stevens explained that if an employer were to refuse employment, based
solely on the use of a prosthetic limb (where the impaired individual's ability to perform
the work was in no way affected), the individual might not qualify for protection of the
ADA because most employers do not view such a prosthesis as a disability. He asserts
that this is objectively wrong.'0 7 Stevens's objection, however, lies not with the first
prong of the definition, but with interpretation of the third prong.
In this light, Stevens's dissent loses strength. The Supreme Court's conclusion is
appropriate. The question remains, however, whether this approach is appropriate for
people with learning disabilities.
V. Learning Disabilities Compared to Physical Disabilities:
Adopting an Approach for Self-Accommodations
Given this background, the question arises: how does this apply to Dr. Marilyn
Bartlett? Should the progress she has made towards reading and learning qualify as
"self-accommodation?"
100. See generally Eichorn, supra note 14, at 1427. The article explains,
Legislative history regarding section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act- from which the
ADA utilizes the same text to define disability] reveals that the later three-pronged
definition was designed to address different types of disability discrimination. The
first prong was meant to address direct discrimination based on actual disability and
to provide a definition to facilitate the statute's disability-based affirmative action
requirements. The remaining two prongs were designed to address discrimination
stemming from classification of and perceptions regarding disabilities
Id. (emphasis added).
101. See discussion supra Part III laying out the three pronged definition of disability.
102. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2152 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 2153.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2153-54.
107. id. at 2154.
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A. Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg
The Court in Albertsons provided useful dicta to address this issue. In querying
whether an eye sight impairment qualified as a disability, the Supreme Court com-
mented on the fact that the circuit court had improperly focused on the fact that "the
manner in which [the plaintiff] sees differs significantly from the manner in which most
people see because, [t]o put it in its simplest terms [he] sees using only one eye; most
people see using two.' '10 8 The Court stressed that difference alone does not qualify an
impairment as a disability.109 Instead, the difference must result in a "significant restric-
tion" of ability to see." 0 The question was, then, whether the self adjustments the plain-
tiff had made to be able to see with one eye in a similar fashion to which people with
two eyes see qualified as a self-accommodation that should be taken into account in
determining a disability.
Following the mandate of Sutton, the Court explained that it saw "no principled ba-
sis for distinguishing between measures undertaken with artificial aids, like medications
and devices, and measures undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the body's own
systems.""'' One might argue that such a statement would include learning disabilities.
That is, the actions that a woman takes to improve her cognitive ability qualify as meas-
ures taken on a conscious level with the "body's own systems." The critical question is
then whether "'the body's own systems" includes cognitive adaptations that individuals
employ so that they may understand, learn, read, etc., productively.
B. Learning Disabilities Compared to Physical Disabilities
The case law extrapolations regarding self-accommodations and ADA-protected
disabilities is inappropriate because learning disabilities are inherently different than
physical disabilities. The cognitive coping mechanisms employed by persons with
learning disabilities should not be deemed "self-accommodations" for two reasons. First,
the diagnosis and treatment of learning disabilities is extremely difficult to quantify.
Actions taken to develop learning capacities should be considered as synthesized into
the individual's learning (dis)ability. The individual is left with her ability, at the time of
defining whether her impairment qualifies as a disability, to question whether she is
substantially limited in major life functions. Such an approach is more in accord with
the decisions thus far. Second, for ethical and policy reasons, it is more appropriate to
view cognitive coping mechanisms employed by persons with disabilities as accom-
plishments. This will honor the ADA's foundational goals.
C. Two Obstacles: Defining Learning Disabilities and Offering Proof
of their Existence
In all of the previous cases to which the Supreme Court referred the Bartlett court to
consider, the question of disability pertained to quantifiable physical disabilities with
readily distinguishable medical or other accommodations. In Sutton, the question was
whether corrected or uncorrected eye sight should be the subject of a disability determi-
nation." 2 The Court had data that "each petitioner's uncorrected visual acuity is 20/200
or worse in her right eye and 20/400 or worse in her left eye, but '[w]ith the use of cor-
108. Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2168 (1999).
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2169.
112. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
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rective lenses, each ... has vision that is 20/20 or better.' ' 113 This offered quantifiable
data of the improvement that self-accommodation provided. In Murphy, the petitioner's
blood pressure was 250/160, in its unmedicated state.' 14 But in its medicated state, peti-
tioner's blood pressure was tested at 160/102 and 164/104.115 Again, the quantifiable
nature of the data allowed the Court to clearly define the corrective visual aids and the
medication as the source of the improvement, easily correlating the improvement to the
accommodation.
Learning disabilities are different. In fact, some have even made assertions that
learning disabilities are not quantifiable at all. 1 6 For example, there are many defini-
tions for a learning disability ("LD"). The term is said to lack "any universally accepted
meaning." '1 7 Furthermore, the ADA has not specifically defined which learning im-
pairments qualify as disabilities. Instead, the consensus agrees that "one common fea-
ture of LD individuals is a significant discrepancy between aptitude and actual achieve-
ment. Other common characteristics include academic deficiencies or decreases in moti-
vation level, memory, attention span, social skills, perceptual skills, or other cognitive
abilities.""...
Technology has yet to accommodate reliable diagnosis, and certainly not reliable
and tested treatment (as may be the approach for many physical disabilities). Thus, two
qualities differentiate learning disabilities from physical disabilities, the knowledge of
exactly what a learning disability is, and ways to gauge its unmitigated state.
D. Ethical Considerations: The Supreme Court's Approach in Light of
Substantive Equality
The premise of the 14th Amendment aims to ensure that each and every person is
treated as a respected, responsible, and participating member of society. 19 In the context
of learning disabilities and accommodations, it is the most ethical approach to treat
learning disabilities as they exist in their present state. Society should not attempt to
detach what might be termed "mitigating" accommodations in determining whether
someone has a learning disability. There are two reasons for this. First, by avoiding any
detachment approach, we affirm the autonomous state of the human life and afford the
respect necessary to bring marginalized people into mainstream society. Second, by
113. Id. at 2143.
114. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136 (1999).
115. Id.
116. See THOMAS G. FINLAN, LEARNING DISABIrTy: THE IMAGINARY DISEASE 3 (1994). The author
asserts that "There has never been any scientific evidence that LD [learning disabilities] exists or any evidence
that LD programs help students. Instead, LD theory and practices keep changing to accommodate current
research most of which contradicts previous LD guesswork." Id. at 1. The text also goes on to explain that
almost every textbook on LD begins with some version of the following: 'Learning
disabilities, though very real, remain an intriguing puzzle. This is true, even though
they officially received their name during the mid-1960's. . . . The term learning
disabilities had different meanings to individuals in different professions. It may also
have different meanings to individuals within the same profession. One expert in the
field of special education noted that 'the field [learning disabilities] is in obvious
turmoil, if not disarray. We move to an uncertain future, but when was that not true?
We are at least not afflicted with the illusion of constancy and stability.
Id. at 26.
117. Samuel S. Heywood, Note, Without Lowering the Bar: Eligibility for Reasonable Accommodations on
the Bar Exam for Learning Disabled Individuals Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 33 GA. L. REV.
603,609 (1999).
118. d. at610.
119. See discussion supra Part 11-A, §2.
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recognizing cognitive coping mechanisms as achievements instead of self-accommo-
dations, we are more likely to move society towards the ideal of including all persons in
the life activities that they choose.
Addressing the issue of respect hinges on a subtle understanding of what it would
mean, in practice, to discount mitigating factors. The type of mitigating factors that the
court would most likely have to consider would include measures that an individual has
taken to improve her ability to achieve despite her impairment. These "mitigating fac-
tors" might better be described as accomplishments. To suppose that the court could
confiscate a person's achievement, for the purpose of determining whether she is dis-
abled, is somewhat dehumanizing. It fails to afford the respect that is due to that per-
son's self-actualization and autonomy in the face of adversity. This runs counter to the
respect that the disabilities rights movement and the 14th Amendment seek to guarantee
to persons with disabilities. By rejecting the Supreme Court's physical disabilities ap-
proach when addressing the question of learning disabilities, society affirms that persons
with learning disabilities are capable of the same autonomous, self-actualization that
persons without disabilities achieve.
Indeed, reading Bartlett, the majority's opinion was tinged with a paternalistic tone.
That is, to suggest that society ought to approach a person with a learning disability by
first speculating "but for her efforts to ameliorate the situation, would she be substan-
tially impaired?" falls prey to preventing true inclusion for persons with learning dis-
abilities. This is played out in rather arrogant determinations of what would have been,
especially in light of the fact that experts trained to diagnose and treat learning disabili-
ties are reluctant to come to the same conclusions.120 Rather than perpetuate a stereotype
that a disability is abnormal, society should recognize that all persons have varying
abilities. We all might be placed at different levels on a continuum. 121 Rather than ostra-
cize and dissect where another would fall, but for certain achievements, society should
accept a person's achievements as a part of who he or she is. It places him or her at a
rung on the continuum. Society should focus instead on whether, at that rung, the indi-
vidual qualifies for reasonable accommodations as a person with a disability.
VI. The Proper Comparison Group: Comparable Training, Skills, and Abilities
Thus far, this Note has argued two points. First, it is proper for physical disabilities
to be ascertained in light of self-accommodations that individuals employ. Second, this
mandate should require no analysis or debate regarding cognitive coping mechanisms
that persons with learning disabilities employ to improve their capacity to learn, read,
etc. Instead, because of the difference between a learning disability and a physical im-
pairment, cognitive coping mechanisms internalized to help persons with learning dis-
abilities achieve should not fall under the term "mitigating self-accommodations." These
coping mechanisms are more appropriately viewed as accomplishments, a part of the
individual disability assessment determination. But then the question is, given a person
with a learning disability, on the bar exam, should she be compared to the average per-
son or to persons with her similar training?
120. See generally ROBERT J. STERNBERG AND LOUISE SPEAR-SWERLING, PERSPECTIVES ON LEARNING
DISABILITIES: BIOLOGICAL, COGNITIVE, CONTEXTUAL (Robert Sternberg & Louise Spear-Swerling ed., 1999)
(explaining that the development of diagnosing learning disabilities has been approached from many different
perspectives and while progress has been made there is still far to go).
121. See Eichorn, supra note 14, at 1409-15.
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A. Title H and Public Licensing
Title II of the ADA covers activities of public entities. 122 Licensing and regulation of
professions and occupations is usually a public function carried out by state and local
governments. 123 One commentator has explained the approach in this way:
The ADA is a civil rights law and designed to further the individual rights of dis-
abled persons. One goal of civil rights laws is to benefit the general public by ena-
bling fuller involvement of all citizens in productive enterprises; likewise, licensing
activities benefit the general public by ensuring safe professionals. The two goals of
public safety and individual rights must be balanced by ensuring that the individual
rights of disabled persons are advanced only if the individual is qualified and safe to
practice her or his profession. 24
Given this over-arching purpose, the DOJ has put forth criteria by which to deter-
mine whether someone is disabled. DOJ guidelines suggest that the comparison group
employed should be that of the public at large. The Sutton Court agreed. "Regulations
promulgated by the Justice Department under Title II of the ADA define a 'physical or
mental impairment' as '[a]ny mental or psychological disorder such as mental retarda-
tion, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabili-
ties."" 125 These same regulations define "'major life activities' as 'functions such as ...
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." ' 126 Under Title II,
"substantially limits" is defined as .' [s]ignificantly restrict[s] as to the condition, man-
ner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as
compared to the condition, manner, or duration under with the average person in the
general population can perform that same major life activity."
' 127
Under this approach, Bartlett would be compared to the average person in the gen-
eral population to determine whether her learning disability substantially limits her abil-
ity to perform major life activities. Put into practice, however, this approach is not ap-
propriate. To see how applying such a standard to the case of a licensing situation leads
to obscure results, we can consider the case of medical students claiming disabilities. In
Price v. National Board of Medical of Medical Examiners, 128 plaintiffs claimed that they
required special accommodations because each had documented proof that they suffered
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).129 Without looking in depth at the
nature of their learning disability, it is a useful vehicle for discussion to consider the
comparison group to which the court compared the plaintiffs.
B. Price v. Board of Medical Examiners
In Price, the court held that the proper comparison group was that of the ordinary
person.'30 The court offered two reasons for this. The first appeared to be similar to the
majority approach in Sutton, focusing on the fact that the ADA specified how many
122. See discussion supra Part I & n.40.
123. See James F. Carr, Impact of the ADA on Professional and Occupational Licensing, in THE
AMERICANS wrrH DISABILITIES AcT: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC COSTS 125 (Roger Clegg ed., 1996).
124. Id. at 128.
125. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 328 (1999).
126. Id. citing 28 C.F.R. §35.130(b)(6).
127. Id. citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (emphasis added).
128. 966 F. Supp. 419 (S.D. W. Va. 1997).
129. Id. at 422.
130. See id. at 426.
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persons are thought to suffer disabilities, and the court viewed this as a restriction. The
Price court explained, "a 'learning disability' does not always qualify as a disability
under the ADA... The comparison to 'most people' is required to determine whether a
learning disability rises to the level of a disability under the ADA.",131 The court went on
to explain that such an approach was in accord with the legislative history promulgated
by the DOJ which explains that the comparison group should be the average person.'
32
Furthermore, the court explained that
The 'comparison to most people' approach has practical advantages as well. Courts
are ill-suited for determining whether a particular medical diagnosis is accurate.
Courts are better able to determine whether a disability limits an individual's ability
in comparison to most people. Additionally, this functional approach is manageable
and, over time, will promote a uniform and predictable application of the ADA.1
3 3
The result of this approach was that none of the students were deemed disabled, that
is, substantially limited in comparison to the ordinary individual. 34 The problem with
this lies with the fact that the ordinary individual will not achieve admittance into medi-
cal school. So from the outset, any medical student will be unlikely to qualify for the
protection of the ADA regardless of their learning disability. This does not seem to be a
fair comparison group and instead, a Title I standard seems more appropriate.
C. Title I: Comparable Training, Skills, and Abilities
The district court in Bartlett recognized the medical student's dilemma. Accordingly,
it relied on regulations under Title I and held that Bartlett "[was] disabled in her ability
to 'work' because her reading rate compared unfavorably with 'persons of comparable
training, skills, and abilities.""
135
This employment discrimination standard is the one used by the EEOC. The district
court viewed the bar exam as an employment test. Despite Bartlett's suit brought under
Title II, the district court saw fit to use the employment standard. The district court's
reasoning demonstrates the proper approach. In defining a disability, the DOJ explains
that included in its definition are the provisions included in Titles I and III that are not
inconsistent with the Rehabilitation Act.'3 6 Under this approach, perhaps it is in the
court's purview to adopt the EEOC's approach of comparing the plaintiff to others with
comparable training, skills, and abilities.
The obstacles faced by this approach are those described in the Price case. 37 There
is concern that the approach might prove over-inclusive. There is also the question of
whether it is practical for courts to employ. Ethical implications, however, must also be
considered.
1. Over-Inclusion
The current trend is that employers prevail in disputes regarding reasonable accom-
modations, there is little'reason to think that a different approach will lead to an unmer-
ited windfall to claimants. The American Bar Association's (ABA's) Commission on
Mental and Physical Disability Law investigated claims that the ADA legislation un-
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. Id. at 427.
134. See id. at 428.
135. Bartlett, 156 F.3d at 326 (2d Cir. 1998), quoting Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners,
970 F.Supp. 1094, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
136. See 28 C.F.R. §35.103.
137. See Price, 966 F. Supp. at 426-27 (S.D. W. Va. 1997).
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fairly favored employees with disabilities over employers of persons with disabilities.'38
These results may shed light on whether claimants fair better than defendants. These
findings offer empirical evidence regarding the approach in question.
The study revealed that employer victories far outweighed employee victories. The
Reporter reviewed 1,200 case decisions. 139 In the 63.3% of cases where a final decision
had been made by the court (i.e. finding for the employee or the employer), employers
prevailed 92.11% of the time. Employees prevailed in only 7.89% of those cases.1
40
Further, an analysis of EEOC statistics reveals that of the 83,158 complaints resolved
from 1992 through 1997, only 13.6% were decided in the employees' favor, as com-
pared to 86.4% decided in the employers' favor. 14 1 The statistics indicate that ADA
claimants litigate their cases in just over half of the time. Further, those claimants who
reach the litigation stage are rarely successful. There is little reason to suspect that by
clarifying its approach in the case of learning disabilities the Court will create an un-
merited windfall to claimants.
2. Practical Employability
Since proving a disability often requires documentation from an expert, the expert is
just as well, if not better, equipped to compare two specific groups. In order to establish
the existence of a disability, as earlier discussed, courts require an analysis of each per-
son's individual limitation. This often requires documentation of the claimant's disabil-
ity issued from an expert or other professional qualified to make such a diagnosis. It is
then for the court to decide whether or not such testimony is sufficient.
The individual claiming the disability has the obligation to provide appropriate
documentation of the existence of the learning disability when placing it at issue...
Unlike a student in a wheelchair, whose disability is obvious and who clearly qualifies
as a protected individual in most situations involving discrimination in the college set-
ting [the example the ABA uses to illustrate its point], the student claiming a learning
disability must prove it. It is legitimate for the admissions office or the student service
office to request documentation. Such documentation should be prepared by a profes-
sional qualified to diagnose a learning disability. The documentation should include
testing procedures, instruments, results, and interpretations. It should reflect the individ-
ual's present achievement level and the results of testing for intelligence, vocabulary,
reading rate, reading comprehension, spelling, mathematical comprehension, memory,
and processing skills.
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Since expert testimony is required under either standard, courts face the same diffi-
culty in employing either standard. By narrowing the comparison group, however, the
Title I standard makes it more likely that the expert's analysis of the claimant's individ-
ual limitation will prove meaningful to courts. In conclusion, the available data suggests
that employing the Title I standard will not pose any increased impracticability upon the
courts. We must then question whether the Title I standard is the best choice, under
normative analysis.
138. See Commission on Mental & Physical Disability Law, American Bar Ass'n, Study Finds Employers
Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 Mental & Phys. Disability L. Rep. 403
(1998).
139. See id. at 404.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 11, at §3.22.
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D. Ethical Considerations
The Title I comparison standard respects achievements that persons with disabilities
have made and decreases stigma attached to persons with disabilities who seek profes-
sional careers. Whether a claimant will qualify for protection under the Act hinges in
part upon the comparison group to which she is compared. In the case of professional
licensing, and higher education as well, the proper comparison group should be the same
as employed in Title I of the ADA, persons with similar comparable training, skills, and
abilities. There are two ethical justifications for this assertion.
First, as explained earlier, 143 the cognitive coping mechanisms that persons with
learning disabilities employ should not be discounted in making the disability assess-
ment. These efforts should not limit a person's opportunities either. For example,
Bartlett has substantially increased her word recognition and learning capacities; she has
reached a high level of achievement in receiving admittance to and graduating from law
school. This high level of achievement places her in an intellectual strata above that of
the ordinary person. This should not preclude her from the opportunity to practice law, if
she proves so qualified. If she is compared to persons of ordinary or average learning
ability, however, she will likely not qualify as suffering a substantial limitation. This, in
point, helps to substantiate that she has the ability and aptitude to do well on the bar
exam. But it should not preclude reasonable accommodations that will enable her to
reach her potential to practice the law. If it did, a strong message would be sent to per-
sons with learning disabilities that there is a ceiling set for accomplishment. Achieve-
ment up to the average or ordinary person's achievement will be accommodated, but
beyond this, one is without consideration. This runs counter to the inherent respect and
empathy that the Equal Protection Clause demands.
Second, failure to adopt the EEOC standard would merely perpetuate stereotypes
and discrimination regarding the qualifications of persons with disabilities who seek
professional occupations. It would do so because denying persons with learning dis-
abilities accommodations such as larger print would weed out persons not on their abil-
ity to meet the merit requirements of a position, but based on the fact that their merit
does not show itself by way of ordinary measures. Systematically preventing a group of
persons to enter a field of work will lead to a marked absence in the workplace. The
result of this absence is likely to create a presumption that the absence is due to merit
deficiency. This surely will not decrease stigma, the antithesis of equality. Furthermore,
this sends a message to persons with learning disabilities that they are not welcome in
the upper ranks of society. Instead, they are subjected to remain ordinary or average, at
best. Such demoralization will not inspire individuals to continue to make efforts to be
integrated into society.
VII. Conclusion
As described throughout this Note, the overarching goal of the disabilities rights
movement is the inclusion of persons with disabilities in mainstream society. Accom-
modations are crucial in facilitating this goal. Whether individuals qualify for accom-
modations turns on whether they fall under the defined category of disabled, as set forth
in the ADA. The majority of caselaw in this regard has focused on the question of
physical disabilities.
Today, Congress and the courts must grapple with the question of learning disabili-
ties as well. In this regard, two approaches should be adopted to honor both the legal and
policy issues connected with the ADA. The cognitive coping mechanisms that persons
143. See discussion supra Part IV.
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with learning disabilities employ should not be considered self-accommodations, in the
legal sense of the word. Instead, such actions ought better to be seen as accomplish-
ments, and accordingly become part of the individual assessment of whether a claimant
should qualify for reasonable accommodation. This honors the plain language of the
statute. It also affords persons with disabilities the respect and autonomy that will lead
to the realization of their aspirations.
The second approach that should be adopted is that, in questions of learning dis-
abilities, the appropriate comparison group that courts should employ is that of Title I of
the ADA, comparable training, skills, and abilities. This honors the intent of the Act,
which is to encourage the integration and success of persons with disabilities. It is un-
likely to prove impracticable, or over-inclusive in practice.
While the discussion regarding these two recommendations has focused extensively
on the case of reasonable accommodations in a professional licensing question, the legal
and moral underpinnings of this analysis are impottant for other purposes as well. For
example, this analysis is important for employers and places of higher education across
the nation. The methodology for determining a disability that is ultimately adopted by
the courts and legislature will inevitably hold implications for the ways that social in-
stitutions approach the issue. With the theoretical, technical, and policy analysis consid-
ered in the case of professional licensing, institutions may choose whether to adopt the
standard that the courts and legislature adopt or a more comprehensive protection. The
critical issue is whether the courts and the Legislature adopt a standard that will guaran-,
tee a just result: people able to achieve their fullest potential.
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